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Representatives or Experts?  
Civil Society Organizations in the EU’s External Relations  
ABSTRACT 
It is often claimed that the participation of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) can miti-
gate the democratic deficit of the European Union. This claim rests on the assumption 
that civil society organizations channel citizens’ concerns to the European institutions, a 
view which is also shared by the European Commission. But whom do Brussels-based 
CSOs actually represent? Some have accused Brussels CSOs of being elitist and de-
tached from their membership bases, but not much evidence has been provided by either 
these critics or by the CSO sympathizers. This paper contributes to filling this knowl-
edge gap by exploring the geographical representativeness of EU CSOs and the extent 
to which they involve their members in organizational activities and decision-making. 
CSOs in European Trade Policy (ETP) and in European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) serve as case studies. It is assumed that the different political opportunity struc-
tures in these policy fields, namely the Commission’s demand for geographical repre-
sentativeness and member representation in ETP and the Council’s interest in CSOs’ 
knowledge and expertise in ESDP, are also reflected in the organizational structures of 
CSOs. The results confirm this hypothesis with regard to the geographical outreach of 
the organizations interviewed, but not with regard to the ways CSOs involve their 
members. CSOs in External Trade Policy have member organizations in a large number 
of European countries while many CSOs in ESDP lack a membership base. However, 
the member-based organizations of both policy fields involve their members in strategic 
decision-making and in diverse organizational activities and they communicate fre-
quently with them. Evidence for a detachment of CSO secretariats in Brussels from 
their membership bases is scarce in the CSOs subject to this study.  
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Representatives or Experts?  
Civil society organizations in the EU’s external relations 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have become important actors on the international 
political stage. Their numbers have increased considerably over the last twenty years 
and they have gained an ever more important role in European and international gov-
ernance. International organizations have opened up to CSOs and improved the access 
for CSOs to decision-making processes by inviting them to participate in public hear-
ings and consultations (Martens 2005; Steffek 2007; Tallberg 2008). CSOs are no 
longer seen only as opponents by governments and international organizations but have 
come to be seen as partners in policy-making. This is also true for the EU institutions, 
which have developed close relations with civil society organizations. Members of the 
European Parliament meet regularly with representatives of civil society. Different Di-
rectorates-General of the Commission have established frequent contacts with civil so-
ciety organizations in recent years, sometimes even on an institutionalized basis. This 
new trend is due to several democratizing functions associated with civil society organi-
zations. The participation of CSOs, it is argued, will enhance accountability and trans-
parency of international policy-making. CSOs can promote equality and plurality by 
giving voice to those otherwise unheard. They provide valuable expertise and knowl-
edge to improve the quality of European governance and finally, they are said to chan-
nel interests and concerns present in the European citizenry to decision-makers in the 
EU institutions. In this paper, the focus will be on the latter function. Some scholars 
have expressed doubt that CSOs can actually take on this intermediary role. CSOs, so 
the critics, have become professionalized and detached from their membership. They 
tend to prioritize efficiency over member involvement. The question has been raised of 
how groups that are themselves not organized democratically can possibly contribute to 
strengthening democracy. Some of the sceptics have engaged in the development of 
criteria for the democratic governance of CSOs (e.g. Steffek et al. 2010a; Uhlin 2009a; 
Wiercx 2009) or simply called for a better structuring and more representativeness of 
these groups.  Among those who see CSOs as a panacea and those who question their 
capacity to act as intermediaries between citizens and the political institutions very few 
have presented empirical results to prove their respective point. How representative are 
CSOs really and to what extent do they reflect the interests and concerns of their mem-
bers? This paper contributes to filling this knowledge gap and provides an empirical 
account of CSOs’ actual performance as a link between civil society and the EU institu-
tions. In an explorative study, it examines the territorial representativeness of EU CSOs 
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and the extent to which they involve their members in organizational activities and deci-
sion-making. 
2 THE PARTICIPATION OF ORGANIZED CIVIL SOCIETY 
Most authors refer to the involvement of organized civil society when discussing civil 
society participation in the EU. Note should be taken that the European institutions also 
engage in other forms of civil society involvement targeted at individual citizens. The 
citizens’ initiative is a case in point (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European 
Union, Art. 11.4)1 Also, different Directorates-General of the European Commission 
engage in launching online consultations, where participation is not always limited to 
organized civil society but open to lay people as well (cf. Ferretti and Lener 2008; 
Quittkat 2009). Other forms of direct citizen engagement include European Citizens’ 
Conferences (Boussaguet and Dehousse 2008) or online forums (Wright 2007). How-
ever, this paper focuses on the most common form of civil society participation in the 
EU, i.e. the involvement of civil society organizations, which Habermas has called the 
“institutional core” (Habermas 1996:367) of civil society.  
The term “civil society organization” is applied here as opposed to other denomina-
tions, such as interest or lobby groups or non-governmental organizations, to account 
for the wide variety of non-state actors active at the European Union. While the term 
interest and lobby group is often associated with the representation of the special inter-
ests of professional or business associations, the term non-governmental organization is 
usually applied to organizations acting in the public interest and for the common good.2 
Civil society organization in this paper denotes a non-governmental, non-profit organi-
zation that has a clearly stated purpose, legal personality, and pursues its goals through 
political advocacy and in non-violent ways (cf. Steffek et al. 2010b). This comprises 
“classical” non-governmental organizations, but also the social partners (i.e. labour and 
employers associations), consumer associations, charities, and religious groups. It is 
also appropriate and useful to apply this broad definition because it is used by the Direc-
torate-General External Trade in the European Commission for the organizations in-
volved in its “Civil Society Dialogue” and the organizations participating in this dia-
                                                 
1  Article 11.4 reads: “Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member 
States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to sub-
mit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the 
purpose of implementing the Treaties.” (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union)  
2  Organizations defending “public goods” pursue goals which by their nature benefit others, beyond the organiza-
tion’s members (Graziano 1996:308).   
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logue will be in the centre of this analysis. In the terminology used by DG Trade, the 
whole range of groups mentioned above is included under the heading of “civil society 
organizations”.3 
2.1 The democratizing functions of CSOs 
There is not just one but there are several ways in which CSOs are said to bolster de-
mocratic governance. The following democratising functions of CSOs are mentioned 
most frequently in the literature (see e.g. Collingwood and Logister 2005:181; Fung 
2003; Kohler-Koch et al. 2008; Uhlin 2009b; Warren 2001). CSOs  
 take up interests and concerns present within the citizenry and feed them into 
the policy-making process, thereby contributing to the input legitimacy of EU 
policy-making, 
 improve the quality of governance by providing expertise and knowledge, 
thereby contributing to the output legitimacy of European governance, 
 enhance political accountability (e.g. by making decision-making more trans-
parent) and limit state power (e.g. by providing resistance against an oppres-
sive regime), 
 act as schools of democracy by fostering civic virtues and political skills 
(Tocqueville 1998). 
 
In this paper the first function mentioned above is under scrutiny. The question is 
whether CSOs actually take up views from the citizenry to transmit them to decision-
makers in the EU, thereby ensuring that governance is not only for but also by the peo-
ple and thus contributing to the EU’s input legitimacy. According to Scharpf, democ-
racy is a two-dimensional concept, relating to the inputs and the outputs of the political 
system. On the input side it is required that political choices be derived, “directly or 
indirectly, from the authentic preferences of citizens” while on the output side the effec-
tiveness of political decisions must be ensured (Scharpf 1997:19, emphasis in original). 
The possible contribution of CSOs to input legitimacy is not considered to be more im-
portant than the other functions. However, it is one that features very prominently in the 
recent discourse and it is often implicitly assumed that CSOs actually fulfil it. It should 
be noted that although the focus in this paper is on this specific function, it is closely 
interlinked with the others listed above. If CSOs manage to reach out to their constitu-
encies this also strengthens their potential to fulfil the other democratising functions 
mentioned above.  
                                                 
3  See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/csd_proc.cfm  
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2.2 The intermediary role of CSOs  
The idea that civil society organizations channel citizens’ interests and concerns to deci-
sion-makers in international organizations has also been called the “transmission belt” 
thesis (Steffek and Nanz 2008:8). In this view, CSOs function as intermediaries be-
tween citizens and government by transmitting their members’ needs and preferences to 
the political institutions (Fung 2003:523): “CSOs can give voice to citizens’ concerns 
and channel them into policy processes that are dominated by diplomats and other gov-
ernment officials” (Nanz and Steffek 2005:371).4 CSOs “breach sic the knowledge and 
interest gap that exists between the great majority of citizens and the practitioners of EU 
politics” (Warleigh 2006:68) and can help “to create a general perception of the com-
mon good” through their participation in public information and communication proc-
esses (De Schutter 2002:202). CSOs are seen as an important complement to the territo-
rially fragmented interest representation through government representatives (Nanz and 
Steffek 2007:94; Warren 2001:83). They can organize interests detached from territorial 
boundaries and “so may introduce geographically dispersed interests that would be oth-
erwise politically mute” (Fung 2003:523). They can channel citizens’ interests and con-
cerns directly to international decision-makers by circumventing the national level 
(Nanz and Steffek 2007:94).5 
Authors defending the transmission belt thesis are interested in the contribution of 
CSOs to the input legitimacy of the EU. From an output-oriented perspective, it would 
not matter where arguments originate as long as they increase the knowledge base and 
expertise and thus lead to better policy-making. In this view, CSO positions do not have 
to reflect citizens’ views and organizations representing interests detached from citizens 
could also make a valuable contribution. However, this is not the position taken in most 
of the literature dealing with CSOs as legitimizing agents (cf. Finke 2007:10), which 
this paper aims to address.  
2.3 CSOs as agents of democratization in the EU? – critical voices 
The emphasis on the democratic potential of CSOs in the academic as well as practical 
discourse has also brought critical voices to the fore. A number of scholars are rather 
                                                 
4  The “transmission belt” functions in two directions: Besides channelling concerns from civil society upward, 
CSOs lso reach back down into the citizenry and channel political decisions from the institutions downward. 
5  Usually, civil society participation is thought to complement and not replace elements of representative democ-
racy at the European level (see e.g. De Schutter 2002:202; Magnette 2003:13). But while the Lisbon Treaty re-
states representative democracy as the principle upon which the European Union shall be founded, it mentions 
participatory mechanisms to exist alongside it (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Art. 10.1 
and 11).  
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sceptical of CSOs’ democratic contribution. Two main lines of criticism can be distin-
guished, one taking issue with the EU’s concept of “participatory governance” and the 
other one addressing CSOs and their capacity to link up with the wider citizenry.    
Those taking issue with the European Commission’s ideas of civil society participa-
tion mostly react to the apparent lack of clarity in the Commission’s conception of civil 
society’s role. They deplore that the White Paper still focuses too much on efficiency 
and hence output legitimacy as opposed to authentic participation by EU citizens and 
input legitimacy. The conditions for the latter are not met, so they claim; the EU’s par-
ticipatory regime is ill-conceived and the Commission misconceives the nature of civil 
society (Tsakatika 2005; Magnette 2001; Smismans 2003; Greven 2007; Eriksen 2001; 
Zittel 2008; Peeters 2003; Friedrich 2008:82).  
Other scholars put a critical eye on CSOs themselves. They claim that CSOs are not 
democratically structured, that,  in line with Robert Michels’ iron law of oligarchy,  they 
have professionalized and become detached from their base of members or supporters, 
or that they are prioritizing efficiency over member access (see Halpin 2006:920 for an 
overview). De Schutter argues that “[i]f the implication of the civil society […] in the 
future is to become a reality, its organizations need to be better structured […]” 
(2002:209). Peeters focuses on NGO consortia6 in Brussels and claims that “In practice 
[…], consortia must react rapidly to EU policy, not leaving enough time for proper 
[member] consultation. This situation gives consortia staff members – often just a hand-
ful of people based in Brussels, a lot of leeway in decision-making and disproportionate 
power and influence.” (Peeters 2003:12). Others question the role of CSOs as agents of 
input legitimacy: “Faced with tough competition to gain voice and ear-time, the focus is 
on professionalization and strategic action and not so much on furthering the communi-
cative links between the representatives in Brussels and their home base.” Conse-
quently, CSOs “may contribute to good governance for the people but will hardly be a 
valid indicator for good governance by the people.” (Edler-Wollstein and Kohler-Koch 
2008:204-5, emphasis in original). This paper engages with this latter criticism directed 
towards CSOs, and investigates to what extent the accusations are justified.  
It is not suggested here that internal democracy is a necessary condition for CSOs to 
contribute to more democratic governance.7 To the contrary, it is acknowledged that 
                                                 
6  In the last decade, NGOs have organized themselves in consortia, such as the Green 10 for environmental NGOs 
or the Social Platform for NGOs working on social policy. The consortia assemble the leading NGOs and NGO 
federations working in a specific policy field (cf. Peeters 2003).  
7  It should be noted that the question of internal democracy for associations was already debated in Germany in the 
1970s. A proposed law to regulate the inner-organizational structures of associations was rejected in Germany in 
the 1970s. It was perceived to lead to a “juridification of the remaining pluralistic leeway in the political system” 
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CSOs can also make a contribution to output legitimacy by means of their expertise or 
as watchdogs of good governance.8 However, it is assumed that in order to fulfil a spe-
cific democratising function, namely a contribution to input legitimacy, CSOs have to 
be able to reach down into the citizenry and channel concerns and interests upward. 
Therefore, when wanting to find out whether civil society organizations can have this 
specific role, the internal governance of CSOs has to be in the focus. 
3 THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
THE COUNCIL AND CSO PARTICIPATION 
The claim that civil society organizations can act as intermediaries between citizens and 
the decision-makers of the European Union has not only been put forward in the aca-
demic literature; it is also shared by practitioners, not least by the European institutions 
themselves. The European Commission is the body of the EU that has been most active 
in promoting “participatory engineering”(Zittel 2008).9 As the motor of EU integration 
and as the body that lacks a territorial base of voters it has not only been interested in 
using civil society as the key to administrative reform, but also as a source of legitimacy 
for its institutional bureaucracy and the European system as a whole (Smismans 
2005:106). In reaction to the intensifying debate about the democratic deficit of the 
European institutions, the European Commission started to enhance its dialogue with 
civil society organizations after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, at a time 
when the “permissive consensus” about further European integration started to corrode. 
                                                                                                                                               
(von Alemann and Heinze 1981:117, translation by author). The law, which had been promoted by liberal and 
conservative forces, was also not approved because it was perceived to be one-sided and targeted at the weaken-
ing of trade unions, which would have more difficulty in complying with the law (Offe 1981). 
8  Halpin (2006) proposes to distinguish between representation (He uses the term “representation” to refer to what 
is here more narrowly called “representativeness”.) and solidarity as concepts for CSOs, depending on the type of 
constituency a group advocates for. He points out that different kinds of CSOs exist and representation is not a 
relevant concept for all of them. While some do not have members at all whom they could represent, others do 
have affiliates but do not claim to represent them (Halpin 2006:921-22). Greenwood (2010) also stresses that 
there are certain kinds of CSOs, such as single-issue organizations, advocacy groups, and think tanks, that do not 
have members or representative structures but nevertheless provide valuable input. These might contribute to de-
mocratic governance through their expertise and knowledge or by acting as watchdogs (see also Obradovic 
2009:9).  
9  “Participatory engineering” has been defined as “the purposeful attempt of political institutions to activate citi-
zens’ political participation by either addressing citizens directly or indirectly through associations that represent 
citizens’ interests.” (Edler-Wollstein and Kohler-Koch 2008:198). 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 137) 
 
- 7 - 
It broadened the circle of organizations to be consulted from special interest groups di-
rectly affected by common market policies to associations in fields such as social policy 
and migration (Smismans 2003; Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007). In the Commission’s 
Communication on the promotion of voluntary organizations in Europe (European 
Commission 1997), the importance of CSOs for European governance is recognized, 
but a role for them in legitimizing European governance is not yet spelled out 
(Smismans 2003:477). The Discussion Paper on non-governmental organizations pub-
lished by the Commission in 2000 then acknowledges the contribution CSOs10 can make 
to legitimate European governance. It names different democratizing functions of CSOs 
and clearly includes a view of CSOs as providers of input legitimacy. The paper argues 
that although the decision-making process in the EU is “first and foremost legitimised 
by the elected representatives of the European people” […], “NGOs can make a contri-
bution to [sic] in fostering a more participatory democracy” (European Commission 
2000:4). CSOs are seen to represent the views of specific groups of citizens, reach out 
to the disadvantaged, and provide a voice for those not heard through other channels 
(European Commission 2000:5). The importance of civil society for EU policy-making 
is further stressed in the White Paper on European Governance of 2001. It refers to 
CSOs’ role as providers of output legitimacy but also evokes input legitimacy by men-
tioning the importance of authentic participation by the European citizens through civil 
society involvement: “It is a chance to get citizens more actively involved in achieving 
the Union’s objectives and to offer them a structured channel for feedback, criticism and 
protest.” (European Commission 2001:15) In its 2002 Communication on general prin-
ciples and minimum standards for CSO consultation, the Commission argues that mem-
bership in associations is an alternative way for to citizens to be politically active, be-
yond political parties and elections (European Commission 2002:5). The language used 
by the Commission demonstrates that it is no longer only interested in the expertise and 
knowledge that non-state actors can provide but also in their function as representatives 
of European citizens. The reason for this lies in the Commission’s aspiration to 
strengthen its democratic credentials and institutional position. Unlike the European 
Parliament, which is elected by the EU citizens, and the Council of the EU, which 
represents the member states, the Commission is not elected and lacks a territorial base 
of voters. Therefore, the consultation of civil society organizations and the possible se-
curing of their support is seen by the Commission as an attractive alternative for 
                                                 
10  At this time the Commission still used the term “non-governmental organization (NGOs)”, which was later 
changed into “civil society organizations (CSOs)”. Recently, the term “interest groups” has become prominent 
again.  
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strengthening its legitimacy and also as a vehicle to increase its bargaining power vis-à-
vis the member states (Saurugger 2010:179).  
The only official Council document regarding CSOs are the “Recommendations for 
enhancing cooperation with NGOs and CSOs” approved by the Committee for Civilian 
Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom) in 2006. According to the recommendations, 
the aim of “regular informal exchanges” with CSOs, whose expertise and knowledge is 
recognized, is operational efficiency (Council of the EU 2006). Therefore, the Council 
frames the relationship with CSOs in terms of better policy-making and is thus inter-
ested in the improvement of output legitimacy.  
This suggests that the Commission and the Council have very different institutional 
demands when it comes to civil society participation. The Council’s interest in CSOs is 
limited to the latter’s expertise while the Commission additionally focuses on their al-
leged role as representatives of European citizens. It is likely that these different de-
mands have an impact on the CSOs involved with the two institutions, more specifically 
on their internal structure. While for CSOs predominantly engaged with the Commis-
sion there is an incentive to feature a structure “representative of European citizens”, 
this incentive is absent for CSOs dealing chiefly with the Council.  
3.1 CSO representativeness 
Along with the greater role foreseen for CSOs in EU policy-making, the expectations 
towards CSOs in terms of their legitimacy and accountability have also risen. In this 
vein, organizational representativeness has become a prominent issue both in the aca-
demic debate and in the European Commission’s discourse (cf. Obradovic 2009; Smis-
mans 2009). For a long time reserved for the social partners (i.e. organizations entitled 
to negotiate collectively binding decisions), representativeness has over time become a 
criterion for all civil society organizations (Smismans 2009). While some reject the ap-
plicability of the concept to CSOs11 altogether, others support different facets of it. De 
Schutter (2002:209), for example, expresses support for the list of criteria for represen-
tativeness put forward by the European Economic and Social Committee (2001). The 
list includes requirements for territorial representativeness as well as authority to speak 
for members and accountability towards them.12 In de Schutter’s view, “at a minimum, a 
certain correspondence between, on the one hand, the claim to representativeness of the 
                                                 
11  Bluemel, for example, argues that the role of NGOs is not to be representative but to raise awareness (2005:146). 
12  In order to be consulted by the European institutions an organization must e.g. exist permanently at Community 
level; provide direct access to its members' expertise and hence rapid and constructive consultation; have member 
organizations in most of the EU Member States; provide for accountability to its members, and have authority to 
represent and act at EU level (European Economic and Social Committee 2001, 3.4.1, at 6). 
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organization, and on the other hand, its membership and modes of internal decision-
making, could be required” (De Schutter 2002:210).13 Others focus on the communica-
tive practices between CSOs and their members. Warren argues that “[w]hatever powers 
associations have to represent their members depends in part on their capacities to com-
municate the interests, norms, and identities of members to public officials. One condi-
tion of representative communication is that there exist organized communication be-
tween members and those who claim to speak for them.” (Warren 2001:84). Similarly, 
Guo and Musso’s concept of participatory representation “highlights the importance of 
maintaining a variety of channels of communication and participation between an or-
ganization and its constituents to ensure that the organization is receptive to its constitu-
ents’ demands” (Guo and Musso 2007:315; cf. Loewenberg and Kim 1978).14 
In the White Paper on European Governance of 2001, the Commission states that 
“with better involvement comes greater responsibility” (European Commission 
2001:15). It postulates that civil society organizations must themselves follow the prin-
ciples of good governance, which includes improving their representativeness and prov-
ing that they can lead on debates in the Member States (European Commission 
2001:17). This approach was further pursued in the 2002 Communication on general 
principles and minimum standards. Here CSOs seeking to contribute to EU policy de-
velopment must be ready to provide information on “which interests they represent” and 
“how inclusive that representation is” (European Commission 2002:17). While  it does 
not intend to use representativeness as the only criterion for judging the relevance or 
quality of contributions, the Commission nevertheless puts much emphasis on this point 
(European Commission 2002:11-12). In spite of these advances, a clear definition of 
what representativeness means is still missing. The newly created register of interest 
representatives15 has not changed this situation. Established “to let citizens know which 
general or specific interests are influencing the decision-making process of the Euro-
pean Institutions and the resources mobilized to that end”16, the register is voluntary and 
does not include any yardsticks for CSOs’ internal structure. An account of the territo-
rial outreach of CSOs active at the EU level and of their communicative links with their 
members is thus clearly needed. 
                                                 
13  Curtin also argues in favour of representativeness, possibly codified in a right for associations (Curtin 2003:71). 
14  This could also be called the ‘responsiveness’ of an organization. 
15  http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/ 
16  https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/welcome.do 
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4 ANALYSING CSO STRUCTURES AND COMMUNICATION CHANNELS 
It is striking that only very few scholars from both camps,  those who question the de-
mocratising functions of CSOs and those who praise them,  provide empirical evidence 
for their claims. The democratic potential of CSOs active at the grassroots or national 
level has frequently been explored (Barakso and Schaffner 2008; Bolduc 1980; Cnaan 
1991; Guo and Musso 2007; Liston 2009; Ragab et al. 1981; Swindell 2000). Bozzini 
has provided a study of national civil society organizations in ten European countries 
and the extent to which they consult and represent their members (Bozzini 2007). How-
ever, this kind of evidence is missing in most contributions dealing with EU-level 
CSOs. Thus, it is largely unknown how EU CSOs, which have become quite powerful 
and often display complex federal structures, actually function internally. 
There are a  few notable exceptions, all of which present sobering results. Kohler-
Koch et al. consider the organizational structure, locus and demography of leading EU 
CSOs and find a tendency among them “to concentrate communication in the centre 
rather than to give prominence to the ‘periphery’, i.e. the constituencies or grassroots 
members” (Kohler-Koch et al. 2008:22). Others inquire whether CSOs can contribute to 
the creation of a European public sphere or act as “agents of political socialization” 
(Warleigh 2001). Warleigh concludes that EU CSOs are currently unable to promote the 
political socialization of their supporters: CSOs’ “internal governance procedures are 
insufficiently democratic” and “decision-making is normally left in the hands of key 
officers, with very little – if any – supporter input”. Moreover, he finds “no evidence 
that supporters are unhappy with this passive role, displaying at best little interest in the 
EU” (Warleigh 2001:623). Sudbery (2003) studies the role of four NGOs in the prepara-
tion stage of the European Commission’s White Paper. She comes to the conclusion that 
due to an acute lack of resources, the NGOs interviewed prioritized effectiveness over 
citizen participation, thereby strengthening the EU’s output but not input legitimacy. 
The study also finds that EU NGOs do not communicate directly with supporters and 
communication with supporters is mediated through national member organizations 
(Sudbery 2003:94).   
In light of the disillusioning results regarding CSOs’ engagement with individual 
supporters, a different approach is suggested here. Research has demonstrated that EU 
CSOs can have complex multi-level structures. Some need to bridge up to nine organ-
izational levels between the offices in Brussels and the individual citizen (Kohler-Koch 
et al. 2008:18). The question arises whether it is realistic to assume a direct link be-
tween EU level CSOs and individual citizens. Here we propose to “open up the black 
box of interest groups” (Saurugger 2010:184) and start off by exploring to what extent 
EU CSOs consult and involve their direct members, i.e. those they explicitly claim to 
represent at EU level. These members are usually organizations or federations. For non-
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member-based CSOs the possibility for direct links into the European citizenry is taken 
into account as an alternative. 
Of course, in a comprehensive assessment of CSOs’ transmission belt function their 
structure and communication channels “all the way down” would have to be taken into 
account, i.e. it would be necessary to trace the link from a CSO active at the European 
level throughout all organizational levels, down to the individual citizen. Due to re-
source limitations this cannot be done here. Instead, the endeavour will remain limited 
to the first organizational level, i.e. the relationship between the CSOs’ EU level and 
their direct members. However, if the chain of communication at this top level is mal-
functioning or broken, the links to lower organizational levels are also unlikely to work. 
A functioning communication between EU-level CSOs and their members is the pre-
condition for information and preferences to be channelled further down or upwards. 
Studying the representativeness of EU CSOs is thus the important first step to exploring 
the relationship between these groups and the wider European citizenry and contribute 
to the so far “sketchy empirical data” (Saurugger 2010:173) in this field.   
In line with the criteria discussed in the literature with regard to CSO representative-
ness (see chapter 3.1), the analysis will be divided into two distinct sets, investigating 
two different aspects of representativeness and member participation: 
 In the first part of the analysis the territorial representativeness of EU CSOs is 
under scrutiny. The structures and organizational form of EU-level CSOs are 
explored: Do the EU-level CSOs have members or not? Are the members indi-
vidual organizations or are they federations/networks of organizations? In how 
many and in which EU countries are the members based? 
 The second set of the evaluation deals with the CSOs’ internal governance and 
the participation of members in the work of the organization, including the 
communication and consultation mechanisms between the offices in Brussels 
and the members: in which functions are members involved in the work of the 
EU-level CSOs? Are they involved in strategic and operational decision-
making? How are internal conflicts dealt with? How frequently do the Brussels 
office and the members interact? Does the staff in Brussels perceive a trade-off 
between its effectiveness and member participation, and if yes, how is it 
solved? These questions can be subsumed under the heading of participatory 
representation within CSOs.  
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5 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND CASE SELECTION 
5.1 Selection of policy fields 
The links between CSOs and their members are explored comparatively in two policy 
fields: CSOs active in the EU’s External Trade Policy (ETP) will be contrasted with 
those in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Being part of the same dimen-
sion of EU policies – external relations –, they offer variance with regard to the modes 
of decision-making and the institutional interests in civil society participation. As men-
tioned above, these factors are assumed to account for different institutional incentives 
impacting on CSOs and on the way they are internally structured. Decision-making in 
External Trade Policy follows the so-called Community method and the European 
Commission is the driving institution. As such, it is the main target of CSO lobbying 
efforts in this policy field. The Commission is said to be more open to civil society than 
the Council of the EU (Fazi and Smith 2006:31) and this is especially relevant in Euro-
pean Trade Policy. In 1998 a structured dialogue with CSO representatives was initiated 
by the Commission’s Directorate-General for External Trade “to develop a confident 
working relationship between all interested stakeholders in the trade policy field and to 
ensure that all perspectives to EU trade policy can be heard”.17 Regular meetings be-
tween Commission officials and CSO representatives have been held ever since (cf. 
Fazi and Smith 2006:67).  
As opposed to that, ESDP is part of the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy (CFSP). The Council should be the first addressee for CSOs, but access to 
its committees is limited and there is no formalized dialogue structure. Compared to 
ETP the exchange is underdeveloped and often remains at the initiative of CSOs (Fazi 
and Smith 2006:31). However, it has stabilized over time through various initiatives.18 
The European Commission plays a role in ESDP in so far as EU military operations are 
accompanied by civilian instruments. These “flanking measures”, such as democracy 
and human rights promotion, are Commission-controlled (Dembinski 2009:156). As 
                                                 
17  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/index.cfm (last accessed: 18 February 2010) 
18  Each Council Presidency usually hosts a conference in cooperation with peacebuilding CSOs. Under the Finnish 
Presidency in 2006, Recommendations for Enhancing Cooperation with NGOs have been adopted in the frame-
work of EU Civilian Crisis Management (Council of the EU 2006). Regular briefings have been held by civil so-
ciety representatives in the Committee for the civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM) in the framework 
of the Role of Civil Society (RoCS) project, launched under the Finnish and continued under the German Presi-
dency in 2007 (http://eplo.org/index.php?id=220, last accessed: 16 February 2010).  
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such, the Commission has also become a contact point for CSOs and official partner-
ships have been established.19    
With regard to the question of whether these institutional differences impact on the 
CSOs under study, the working assumption is that CSOs in External Trade will be more 
likely to feature a representative structure and consult their members regularly than 
CSOs in ESDP. As pointed out above, the reasons for this are the different institutional 
incentives as well as the institutionalization of the civil society dialogue in Trade Pol-
icy. The European Commission as the main addressee of CSOs in ETP is interested in 
their input in order to legitimize itself and its policies and utilizes CSOs in pursuing 
these interests. Because of this interest it has advanced the dialogue with civil society 
and contributed to the proliferation of CSOs in Brussels “in a purposeful search for 
partners capable of acting as demand agents for further European integration upon 
member states, and in pursuit of connections to ‘civil society’” (Greenwood 2010:202). 
The Commission has expressed its preference for consulting with European federations 
as opposed to individual or national organizations, due to their alleged representative-
ness (Greenwood and Halpin 2005:5). Hence, there is an institutional incentive for 
CSOs active in European Trade Policy to “supply” a representative structure.  
In ESDP this incentive is less prominent. Although the Commission has begun to 
emerge as a partner for peacebuilding CSOs, the Council remains more important in 
decision-making. The member-state representing institution does not need an additional 
channel to legitimize its decision-making and has not made representativeness a re-
quirement for CSOs to be consulted. Moreover, Dembinski argues that the consensual 
mode of decision-making in ESDP provides incentives for rule-based behaviour and 
gives greater importance to expertise and ideas (Dembinski 2009). In this field groups 
                                                 
19  Upon initiative of the European Parliament, the Commission in 2000 and 2001 financed the “Conflict Prevention 
Network”, a consultancy network led by the German Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). In 2006, the 
Commission financed the “Conflict Prevention Partnership”, a project throughout which four CSOs (the Interna-
tional Crisis Group, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), International Alert, and the European 
Policy Centre) provided information and expertise to the EU institutions’ conflict prevention, crisis management 
and peacebuilding policies (http://www.conflictprevention.net, last accessed: 18 February 2010). The Commis-
sion currently finances a similar project which includes ten peacebuilding CSOs, the Initiative for Peacebuilding 
(http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu, last accessed: 18 February 2010). The involved CSOs are Adelphi Re-
search, the Netherlands Institute for International Relations (Clingendael), the Crisis Management Initiative 
(CMI), the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), the European Peacebuilding Liai-
son Office (EPLO), La Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), Interna-
tional Alert, the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Partners for Democratic Change Interna-
tional (PDCI), and Saferworld. 
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are favoured who have expert knowledge and who are able to “frame their issues in 
terms of a common interest” (Dembinski 2009:156), as opposed to organizations de-
fending a political message or an ideology (ibid). The political opportunity structure in 
ESDP does not entail the necessity for CSOs to reflect the interests and opinions of 
European constituencies, but rather to provide easily accessible expertise (cf. Dembinski 
2008, 2009). Therefore there is less institutional demand for CSOs in ESDP to feature a 
representative structure, and rather an incentive for organizational features designed to 
produce coherent messages and well-founded knowledge. While this discussion is dedi-
cated to the demand side, it should be noted that on the supply side it can be expected 
that CSOs both in External Trade Policy and ESDP are interested in demonstrating a 
representative structure to enhance their role as legitimate actors in policy-making.  
5.2 Selection of CSOs and methods 
The primary selection criterion for the CSOs subject to this analysis is their level of 
access to the EU institutions, determined by their involvement in official partnerships 
with the institutions. It is especially salient to investigate whether groups that are closest 
to the EU institutions20 and thus most likely to influence EU policies are still linked to 
their constituencies.21 With regard to European Trade Policy this corresponds to a most-
likely case design: due to the Commission’s emphasis on representativeness it is as-
sumed that the CSOs to whom it grants privileged access are the ones most likely to 
meet this standard. 
What is most important is that CSOs have access to the institution that has the lead-
ing role in proposing policy in each of the policy fields, i.e. the Commission in External 
Trade Policy and the Council in ESDP. In ETP, CSOs have access through the regular 
meetings between DG Trade officials and CSO representatives that have been held since 
the establishment of the Civil Society Dialogue. Beyond these structured exchanges, 
informal contacts exist as well. A large number of CSOs is active in External Trade Pol-
icy. Selection for this analysis was facilitated by a CSO database created in the frame-
work of the Civil Society Dialogue established by DG Trade in 1998. While several 
hundred CSOs have registered to participate in meetings with DG Trade officials, the 
so-called Contact Group, set up by DG Trade as a “facilitator and sounding board”22, 
                                                 
20  The study only takes CSOs with offices in Brussels into account and hence a group of CSOs that is highly privi-
leged in terms of institutional access. The overall population of CSOs engaging with the EU institutions is of 
course much larger and does also include national groups and grassroots organizations.  
21  Ideally, the influence of the selected CSOs would be proved. However, this cannot be done here and the likeli-
hood of being able to take influence has to serve as a proxy.   
22  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/contactgroup.cfm#_terms-of-reference (accessed: 4 February 2010) 
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comprises only around 15 CSOs.23 They serve as focal points for the Commission be-
cause of their alleged representativeness.24 Because of their privileged access to the 
Commission and their likelihood of being representative the CSOs for this analysis were 
selected from this group.25  
In ESDP there is no formalized dialogue structure. However, CSOs active in ESDP 
have managed to establish informal but regular contacts with Council officials, espe-
cially with the Council Presidencies and with the Council Committee for the Civilian 
Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) (Fazi and Smith 2006:31).26 Furthermore, 
Joachim has convincingly shown how CSOs have managed to gain access to decision-
makers during three different instances of policy-making in the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy27 (Joachim 2004). The number of CSOs active in ESDP is much 
more limited28 and the relevant actors could be identified through official partnerships 
between the EU institutions and CSOs in recent years, such as the Conflict Prevention 
Partnership, the Role for Civil Society-Project, and the ongoing Initiative for Peace-
building.29 Furthermore, it was cross-checked with CSOs themselves which other or-
ganizations they considered to be the most important ones in the policy field. 
The empirical data used for this analysis has been collected in two ways: The web-
sites of CSOs have been used to gather information about the CSOs’ organizational 
form, membership structure, and decision-making processes. In addition, semi-
                                                 
23  Membership in the Contact Group rotates between leading CSOs of a sector. DG Trade states not to intervene in 
this selection, see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/contactgroup.cfm#_terms-of-reference (accessed: 4 February 
2010). 
24  Many of the contact group members regularly attend the dialogues, as can be seen from the participation lists 
available on DG Trade’s website. However, there might be other non-contact group organizations who participate 
even more frequently. 
25  It should be noted that due to the rotation principle, some members interviewed have left the contact group since 
the time when the interview with them was conducted and been replaced by other CSOs.  
26  The form of dialogue with the Presidencies ranges from the common organization of high-profile events to the 
implementation of projects, such as the RoCS project (http://www.eplo.org/documents/RoCS.pdf). The coopera-
tion with CIVCOM usually takes the form of briefings by CSO representatives from countries where ESDP Op-
erations are to be deployed (ibid; http://act4europe.horus.be/module/FileLib/EPLO%20presentation.pdf).     
27  The three instances were the elaboration of the European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (1998), the EU 
Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (2001), and the European Security Strategy (2003) (Joachim 
2004).  
28  This can be explained, among other factors, with the late emergence of this policy field (Dembinski 2009:154).  
29  See www.conflictprevention.net, http://www.eplo.org/index.php?id=220, and www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu 
(last accessed: 17 December 2009).  
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structured interviews with CSO representatives were carried out to obtain information 
about communication channels within these organizations and to verify the information 
drawn from the documents mentioned above. Very sporadically I draw on a set of inter-
views conducted with selected member organizations of the EU-level CSOs. 
In European Trade Policy, ten CSOs were selected, two of which did not reply or re-
fused the request for interview. This leaves eight organizations, four of which defend 
general and four special interests.30 In ESDP, nine CSOs were selected as well, eight of 
which defend general interests and one a special interest (defence industry association). 
The latter did not respond to the request for an interview. Hence, a total of 16 CSOs 
were analysed and interviewed, eight CSOs active in ETP and eight CSOs in ESDP. 
The interviews were conducted in Brussels and Berlin31 between July 2007 and July 
2009. In most cases, the interview partners were at the qualification level of policy offi-
cer. 
Table 1: CSOs in European Security and Defence Policy and in European Trade Policy 
European Trade Policy European Security and Defence Policy 
ActionAid 
BusinessEurope 
EuroCommerce 
European Services Forum (ESF) 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE) 
Solidar 
Women in International Development (WIDE) 
Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) 
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) 
International Alert 
International Crisis Group (ICG) 
Partners for Democratic Change Int’l (PDCI) 
Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) 
Saferworld 
Search for Common Ground (SFCG) 
6 RESULTS 
The following sections reports the results for the 16 EU-level CSOs interviewed. In 
ETP, the sample comprises four CSOs defending general interests (ActionAid32, FoEE, 
Solidar, and WIDE), one trade union (ETUC), and three business associations (Busi-
nessEurope, ESF, and EuroCommerce).33 It should be noted that ETUC and Busi-
nessEurope are social partners within the European social dialogue provided for under 
Article 154 and 155 of Treaty on the European Union (formerly Art. 138 and 139 TEC). 
The CSOs analysed in ESDP are EPLO, CMI, International Alert, ICG, PDCI, QCEA, 
                                                 
30  One organization has left the Contact Group since the time of the interview. It is nevertheless included here. 
31  At the occasion of a conference in Berlin at which CSO representatives from Brussels were present. 
32  ActionAid is not part of the civil society contact group at DG Trade any longer and has been replaced by the 
Association of World Council of Churches Related Development Organizations in Europe (APRODEV).  
33  See the annex to this paper for an overview of CSOs interviewed. 
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Saferworld, and SFCG.34 In section 7.1, the findings regarding the organizational type 
and membership structure of the EU-level CSOs will be presented. Section 7.2 is dedi-
cated to the analysis of member participation within the CSOs interviewed. 
6.1 Organizational type and membership structure 
The following section analyses the organizational types to be found in ETP and ESDP 
and the structure of their membership and answers the following three questions:  
 Do the EU-level CSOs have members or not? 
 Are the members individual organizations or are they associations/platforms of 
organizations? 
 In how many and in which EU countries are the members based?  
 
This first set of questions is dedicated to the territorial representativeness of CSOs par-
ticipating in the EU’s external relations. First, it seems to be the basic precondition for 
reaching out into the European citizenry that EU-level CSOs have members who can 
fulfil this function. Alternatively, CSOs without members might engage directly with 
citizens, e.g. by organizing hearings or consultations which demonstrate a willingness to 
take the interests of those concerned into account even in the absence of formal mem-
bership. Second, the organizational form of the CSOs’ members tells us something 
about the size and circumference of the constituency, just like the question about the 
number and the location of members. With regard to the distribution of member organi-
zations within Europe, it is assumed that organizations represent more diverse voices if 
they are represented in a larger number of countries. It is also considered important that 
the different European regions, e.g. northern vs. southern Europe or old vs. new mem-
ber states, be represented in a CSO’s membership. Concerning the third question it 
should be noted that only member organizations from EU countries, representing EU 
citizens, are relevant with regard to the question of whether CSOs can contribute to in-
put legitimacy of EU policy-making. 
6.1.1 CSOs in European Trade Policy 
All eight organizations interviewed in External Trade Policy are membership-based (see 
Table 2). Typically, the member organizations are themselves regional or national net-
works, platforms or associations and thus have a federative structure35, but in some 
                                                 
34  It should be noted that the latter seven are all member organizations of EPLO.  
35  Examples: The Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) is a member of BusinessEurope. The Dutch Gen-
der Platform WO=MEN, a network of more than 40 organizations and individuals, is a member of Women in De-
velopment Europe (WIDE). 
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cases they are also individual organizations and very rarely companies or individuals. 
Table 3 summarizes the numbers of member organizations and the European countries 
in which they are represented. 
ActionAid International has 13 affiliate and “about ten”36 associate members. Af-
filiate members are full members while associates are prospective members with re-
duced voting rights at ActionAid’s decision-making Assembly. Out of the 13 affiliate 
members, only five are located in EU member states. The remaining eight members are 
located on other continents. As opposed to most of the other organizations in the sam-
ple, ActionAid’s members are national chapters, although they are registered as inde-
pendent organizations in the respective countries. All share the same name. The rela-
tionship between them and the international level is governed by contract. The estab-
lishment of new affiliate members can occasionally be implemented from the top down, 
e.g. by transforming an ActionAid country office into a national chapter.37 
BusinessEurope has 40 member organizations in all EU member states and EEA 
countries and in some candidate and potential candidate countries. The members are 
usually national employers’ and industry federations. Only for Malta, the Chamber of 
Commerce, Enterprise, and Industry is a member.  
The European Services Forum (ESF)’s members are 24 companies and 30 associa-
tions. 23 out of the 30 member associations are European federations, such as the Archi-
tects’ Council of Europe, the Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens or Busi-
nessEurope. The remaining seven are national associations, directly representing na-
tional industry federations. Most of the European federations are based in Brussels. 
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has 82 national members. 
They are national trade union associations or confederations. The ETUC has member 
organizations from most EU and EEA member states and the candidate countries. In 
addition, twelve European industry federations are members of ETUC. Four trade union 
confederations from Balkan countries have observer status. 
EuroCommerce’s members are commerce federations, European and national asso-
ciations representing specific commerce sectors and individual companies. According to 
EuroCommerce’s statutes, only national federations can become full members with vot-
ing rights in the General Assembly.38 The full members are often national chambers of 
commerce, but also retailers and traders federations. European and international associa-
tions as well as individual companies are associated members. EuroCommerce’s 46 full 
                                                 
36  Phone interview with representative of ActionAid International, 23 July 2008. 
37  Phone interview with representative of ActionAid International, 23 July 2008. 
38  http://www.eurocommerce.be/media/docs/Public/Statutes/StatutsEnHeadingIII.pdf (last accessed 8 February 
2010) 
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members are located in a large number of EU and EEA countries. Additionally, national 
associations from Croatia and Turkey are represented within EuroCommerce, but with-
out voting rights as the statutes only grant these to associations from EU and EFTA 
countries.39  
Friends of the Earth Europe’s members are 31 environmental organizations from 
EU and EEA countries and EU candidate and potential candidate countries. Beyond 
these, FoEE has members in Georgia and Ukraine. While some members share the same 
name, others do not.   
Solidar has 36 member organizations defending matters of social justice. They are 
located in 13 EU and EEA countries. The Baltic Platform regroups an Estonian, a Lat-
vian, and a Lithuanian organization. Solidar also has a South African member. There is 
an apparent underrepresentation of Eastern European countries and new member states 
within Solidar. Only the Baltic platform contributes some voices from these groups.  
Women in Development Europe (WIDE) is a feminist organization with twelve 
organizational members located in Europe. They are groups working on women’s and 
development issues. A platform of organizations from Central and Eastern Europe and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States countries called Karat is also a member. 
Karat has a total of 31 member organizations in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Mace-
donia, Moldova, Poland, and Romania.40 WIDE also has less than 50 individuals as full 
members from different countries, especially from those where there are no national 
platforms.41 Although the membership does not cover all European countries and misses 
members from some of the large EU member states, WIDE member organizations are 
well spread out over Europe.  
All eight organizations interviewed in European Trade Policy are membership-based. 
The number of full members ranges from 13 to 82. Most of their members are national 
business associations, national trade union confederations and NGO networks with large 
membership bases in their respective countries. Most of these member organizations are 
located in the EU, EEA, and EU candidate countries. A notable exception is ActionAid: 
eight out of its 13 members are located on other continents. The other organizations 
have constituencies in diverse EU and European countries. Not surprisingly, ETUC and 
the business association have the largest and territorially most encompassing member-
                                                 
39  http://www.eurocommerce.be/media/docs/Public/Statutes/StatutsEnHeadingIII.pdf (last accessed 8 February 
2010) 
40  http://www.karat.org/karat,news,Membership,Members,en.html, last accessed 15 March 2010. 
41  The role of the individual members was considered to be too prominent and their number in the Steering Group 
was reduced, according to the representative of a WIDE member organization (interviewed in January 2010). 
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ships. According to the Commission’s Agreement on social policy, referring to Article 
154 (Art. 138 TEC) of the EU Treaty, representativeness in all member states is a re-
quirement for the social partners. However, most of the NGO networks active in ETP 
also have rather wide-spread membership bases, even in the absence of a legal require-
ment. 
Table 2: CSOs in External Trade Policy 
Membership organizations  
(number of full members in brackets) 
Non-membership organizations 
ActionAid (13)  
BusinessEurope (40)  
European Services Forum (ESF) (54)  
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (82)  
EuroCommerce (46)  
Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE) (31)  
Solidar (36)  
Women in Development Europe (WIDE) (12)  
6.1.2 CSOs in European Security and Defence Policy 
The interesting finding when considering the types of organizations to be found among 
CSOs most active in the EU’s Security and Defence Policy is that four out of eight 
CSOs interviewed do not have any kind of membership (see Table 4). All of these or-
ganizations focus either on research activities (ICG) or on the implementation of pro-
jects and programmes in conflict countries (SFCG) or they combine research and ser-
vice delivery (International Alert). All of them also engage in advocacy, at the EU as 
well as at national governments and other international organizations. A further organi-
zation, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), has 200-300 individual members42 who 
“include security and development policy professionals, people interested in CMI’s 
field of work, researchers and decision makers.”43 Becoming a member requires the rec-
ommendation by two existing members. CMI’s members are not involved in any organ-
izational activities.44 They are rather an elite group whose function is to provide exper-
tise. It is not the purpose of CMI to represent them at EU level. According to its mission 
statement, CMI “draws upon in-country operations and applied policy research to sup
                                                 
42  Interview with representative of CMI on 9 July 2007, Brussels. 
43  http://www.cmi.fi/about-us/faq.html (last accessed 5 February 2010) 
44  They are merely invited to the Annual Meeting and they receive the Annual Report of the organization (Interview 
with CMI representative on 9 July 2007, Brussels). Policy decisions are taken by the board and the “leadership 
team”, which consists of senior staff members. 
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port decision-making and to shape policies”.45 CMI’s advocacy is thus based on its ex-
pertise rather than on its members’ input.  
The question arises whether these organizations have alternative mechanisms in 
place for reaching out directly into the European citizenry. When asked whether they 
consulted any one else, beyond their own organization, for decision-making, all of the 
above CSOs answered with differing combinations of EU institution officials, represen-
tatives of national governments, international actors, and other European CSOs. Three 
out of the five CSOs indicated to consult with their beneficiaries or persons affected by 
their work, i.e. usually in countries affected by conflict. However, none of the organiza-
tions speaks directly to European citizens, who are primarily affected by EU foreign and 
security policy decisions (Wagner 2007:3; Stie 2007:1) and who would be important to 
consult for a contribution to the EU’s input legitimacy. The only link between these five 
CSOs and the European citizenry is via the consultation of other European CSOs that 
might have members. This connection must be considered as rather weak. Hence, the 
advocacy of five out of eight CSOs interviewed in ESDP is based on their knowledge 
and expertise, which has partly been acquired through the cooperation with affected 
populations. It is not based on preferences and opinions from within the European citi-
zenry. While five CSOs in ESDP have no members involved in policy-making, the three 
remaining groups are membership-based. All of them have organizational members, but 
differences exist with regard to the size and structure of their membership (see Table 3). 
The members of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) are “individ-
ual NGOs, networks of NGOs, and think tanks”.46 A closer look reveals that 19 out of 
27 member organizations are individual organizations and think tanks who either do not 
have members at all or whose members do not vote or contribute to policy. The remain-
ing eight have member organizations with differing degrees of independence. Seven 
EPLO members are composed of fully independent organizations47, four of which are 
rather top-down endeavours, however, where all member organizations share the same 
name.48 Only one member organization is a national platform, namely the Finnish 
group. All other networks regroup organizations from different European countries or 
even from all over the world. This is surely due to the limited number of CSOs active in 
this policy field which does not allow for the establishment of national platforms yet. 
                                                 
45  http://www.cmi.fi/mission.html (last accessed 5 February 2010) 
46  http://www.eplo.org (last accessed 5 February 2010) 
47  The Finnish Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network KATU, the European Network for Civilian Peace Ser-
vices, the Nansen Dialogue Network, Nonviolent Peaceforce, Partners for Democratic Change International, Pax 
Christi International, the Quaker Council for European Affairs, and World Vision.  
48  Nansen Dialogue Network, PDCI, World Vision, and the Quaker Council for European Affairs  
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However, more national platforms used to be part of EPLO, namely the Swedish and 
the German platform, and left it due to financial problems. While these are partly linked 
to the priority setting of national platforms, the representative of a former EPLO mem-
ber also mentioned the rising membership fees as a problem. They are said to benefit 
large and financially powerful organizations at the expense of national networks, which 
are often under-staffed and under-financed and thus cannot afford to remain members at 
the EU-level.49 All of EPLO’s members have a legal base in Europe (except for one 
member organization which does not have a permanent seat) but some have their head-
quarters in the United States and many have offices in other world regions as well. 
EPLO’s member organizations are distributed over 13 European countries with a strong 
concentration in the old EU member states, especially in the North. Six organizations 
have their headquarters in Brussels, sometimes in addition to headquarters in the United 
States. All of these are international NGOs and not Belgian organizations.  
Partners for Democratic Change was first established in the United States “to con-
tribute to the democratic and economic transition” of Central and Eastern European 
countries after 1989 by establishing “Centers for Conflict Resolution and Change Man-
agement”50 in these countries. Meanwhile the Partners for Democratic Change Interna-
tional (PDCI)-network comprises 18 centres, also in the Americas and the Middle East, 
which are today “independent NGOs with unique specializations” but with “common 
core competencies”51. The centres are registered as foundations in their respective coun-
tries and do not have members, neither organizations nor individuals. Ten of PDCI’s 
centres are located in EU member or potential candidate countries. The Brussels office 
serves as the secretariat for all 18 network members. Due to the historical development 
of the organization, PDCI’s European members are all located in Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe.  
The members of the Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) are 12 Quaker 
organizations, such as the so-called Denmark Yearly Meeting, the France Yearly Meet-
ing, etc. The Yearly Meetings are annual assemblies of people sharing the Quaker way 
of life. They appoint representatives to develop the Quakers’ position on EU policy is-
sues. QCEA’s member organizations thus have individuals as members. QCEA has 
member organizations in 11 EU and EEA countries as well as two Middle-Easter mem-
bers. Even stronger than EPLO, the distribution of QCEA’s member organizations in 
                                                 
49  Phone interview with the representative of a former EPLO member organization, conducted on 4 November 
2009. 
50  http://www.partnersglobal.org/who (accessed 18 December 2009) 
51  http://www.pdci-network.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=38&Itemid=57 
(accessed 18 December 2009) 
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Europe shows a strong bias towards old EU member states, especially from north-
western Europe.  
Table 4: CSOs in ESDP 
Membership organizations 
(number of members in brackets) Non-membership organizations 
Individual members Organizational members  
Crisis Management 
Initiative (CMI) 
(200-300) 
European Peacebuilding Liaison 
Office (EPLO) (27)  
International Alert 
 Partners for Democratic Change 
International (PDCI) (18) 
International Crisis Group 
 Quaker Council for European Af-
fairs (QCEA) (12) 
Saferworld 
  Search for Common Ground (SFCG) 
 
This glance at the organizational structure of the CSOs most active in the EU’s Security 
and Defence Policy reveals that only 3 out of 8 organizations have members and thus 
fulfil the very basic precondition for functioning as transmission belts. 5 out of 8 or-
ganizations in this policy field do not reach out into the European citizenry. Their advo-
cacy positions are developed on the basis of their research or field experience. This 
means that these organizations might be able to contribute to the output legitimacy of 
the EU, but not to its input legitimacy. The three remaining organizations have between 
12 and 27 members. In one of the organizations, two thirds of the members are individ-
ual NGOs and think tanks without members. They do not have any national constituen-
cies aside from their staff and therefore their potential to reach out to citizens is limited. 
In another organization the members are foundations who are also not member-based. 
Moreover, almost half of its members are not located in Europe. However, its European 
members are all located in eastern and south-eastern Europe. Hence it brings voices to 
the fore from a region that is strongly underrepresented in the two other organizations. 
Members of the other two CSOs are almost exclusively located in the old EU member 
states, with a clear dominance in the north and north-west and hardly any in southern 
Europe.  
6.1.3 Summary  
When comparing CSOs in ETP and ESDP it is telling that the predominant organiza-
tional type in External Trade Policy is very different from that in ESDP. While all CSOs 
participating in ETP are associations and federations with large constituencies from 
different European countries, two thirds of the CSOs most active in ESDP are organiza-
tions that lack a membership base. Moreover, comparing member-based CSOs in ESDP 
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and ETP, the latter have a much more encompassing membership base: not only do 
CSOs in ETP mainly regroup platforms and associations and not individual organiza-
tions like CSOs in ESDP, but member-based CSOs in ETP also have more members 
and are present in more EU member states. The results thus confirm the hypothesis that 
CSOs participating in ETP are more representative than CSOs in ESDP due to the insti-
tutional pressure, at least with regard to their territorial reach. Whether this trend is con-
firmed by the way in which CSOs in ETP and ESDP consult their members will be the 
concern of the following section. Of course only the member-based CSOs of the sample 
will be considered. 
6.2 Member participation 
To explore the role and importance that CSO member organizations have within their 
EU-level CSO it is evaluated in which functions they are involved in the work of the 
Brussels secretariats, whether they are involved in strategic and tactical decision-
making, how frequently they are contacted by their representatives in Brussels, and 
whether CSO representatives perceive a trade-off between the effectiveness of the EU 
office and member participation and how is it solved (see Table 5). 
First, it should be noted that all organizations registered as “associations sans but lu-
cratif (asbl)” in Belgium are required to have a general assembly in which all members 
are allowed to vote. This is different for “associations internationales sans but lucratif 
(aisbl)” who do not have to meet this requirement.52 In the sample three CSOs are regis-
tered as asbl (ETUC, FoEE, EPLO) and six as aisbl (BusinessEurope, EuroCommerce, 
Solidar, WIDE, PDCI, QCEA). ActionAid International is a branch of a foundation reg-
istered in The Netherlands and, interestingly, the European Services Forum is registered 
as a sub-department of BusinessEurope.53 The latter eight organizations, for all of whom 
a general assembly is not legally required, have also established decision-making struc-
tures in which the members are formally the key actors. For example, the governing 
body of QCEA is the “Council”, which is composed of QCEA’s members.54 At ESF 
decisions are taken by the “Policy Committee”, which is made up of member represen-
tatives. Based on these formal decision-making structures, the subsequent section will 
be dedicated to the actual participation and consultation practice of the CSOs. 
                                                 
52  Loi sur les asbl, aisbl et les fondations. Download at: http://www.juridat.be/cgi_loi/loi_F.pl?cn=1921062701 
(Last accessed: 10 February 2010) 
53  According to the ESF interviewee, ESF’s policy, management and finances are independent from BusinessEu-
rope’s. (Interview with a representative of ESF on 21 May 2008).  
54  http://www.quaker.org/qcea/about/staff.htm (last accessed: 10 February 2010)  
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With regard to the functions of members, CSOs were asked whether members were 
involved in: 
 helping to provide services to the general public (1), 
 policy-making (2), 
 project/campaign implementation (3), 
 fundraising (4), 
 evaluating organizational activities (5). 
6.2.1 CSOs in European Trade Policy  
All organizations interviewed from the External Trade Policy field involve their mem-
bers in policy-making and project or campaign implementation (functions 2 and 3 listed 
above). All but one organization involve their members in the evaluation of organiza-
tional activities. At ActionAid and Solidar, members participate in all of the functions 
mentioned above. At FoEE and WIDE, members are part of all functions except the 
provision of services to the general public (function 1). BusinessEurope involves its 
members in fundraising in addition to policy making and implementation. The results 
show that all of the CSOs interviewed in External Trade Policy involve their members 
in the crucial function of policy-making, i.e. in decisions about the positions that the 
CSO will defend when doing advocacy in the EU. The business associations tend to 
involve their members in fewer functions than the general interest organizations.55 How-
ever, the sample size is too small to state a general trend. 
In almost all CSOs active in ETP, strategic decisions are taken by bodies in which all 
members are represented, such as annual conferences or general assemblies. Only at 
EuroCommerce strategic decisions are taken by theme-specific committees, which are 
also composed of member representatives. In many CSOs, the body below the all-
member conferences, often called steering group or executive committee, is involved in 
strategic decision-making as well. These bodies are generally composed of some of the 
members. Only ETUC indicated that the advocacy office is also involved in strategic 
decisions. 
Tactical, day-to-day decisions are usually taken in the advocacy office, i.e. by the 
Secretary General, senior staff or staff in general. Two CSOs even indicated to consult 
their members on tactical questions due to a general principle not to take any decision 
without member involvement. 
                                                 
55 This cannot be explained by better member-staff ratios, which are generally better in special interest groups but 
almost as good in some of the general interest groups active in trade policy. See Annex 2.   
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With regard to the frequency of interaction, all officers interviewed claimed to be in 
daily contact with their members, except for the representative of one CSO who indi-
cated to be in touch on a weekly basis.56 
The majority of organizations in Trade Policy do not perceive a trade-off between the 
effectiveness of the organization and member participation. They either argue that 
members have similar goals anyhow or that the general policy guidelines have been set 
and that trust has been built up so that all members agree to decisions taken by the Brus-
sels office within this framework. Effective consultation procedures and agreed dead-
lines are used to ensure a balance between effective advocacy and member access. Two 
CSO representatives even argued that more member involvement will increase their 
organization’s effectiveness. Interestingly, one interviewee openly said that some mem-
bers were more important than others in situations where urgent action is needed: “If 
we’ve got the big four or five saying yes, then that’s it.”57 Two CSOs acknowledged the 
trade-off. Asked about their handling of it, one answered that the organization tries to 
strike a balance between being democratic and effective mainly by setting mutually 
agreed timelines and deadlines for agreement. At the other CSO, efforts are made to 
avoid lowest common denominator politics by providing leadership from the side of the 
Brussels office and convince member organizations of the necessity to take a position 
on certain issues. However, the representative also stressed that to achieve mobilization 
it has to be ensured that the positions are owned by the members. The representatives of 
two CSOs specified that in controversial cases the office refrained from taking a deci-
sion. While all organizations are aware of the importance of member support for their 
work, many have responded with the introduction of mechanisms or structures which 
allow for accelerated decisions and reactions and curtail member participation in indi-
vidual decisions. This includes the setting of deadlines and the institutionalized delega-
tion of decision-making to smaller fora. Such mechanisms are introduced with the ap-
proval of the member organizations, which means that they agree to the loss of consul-
tation for the sake of effectiveness.  
To sum up, all organizations in External Trade Policy involve their members at least 
in strategic, some even in tactical, day-to-day decision-making. Members have a crucial 
role in policy-making and project/campaign implementation. Member contact seems to 
be quite frequent. In spite of the prominent role of members in all of the organizations 
interviewed, some have, in accordance with the members, taken measures to ensure and 
enhance organizational effectiveness at the expense of member access. While it could 
                                                 
56  While this indicates that CSO officers are in touch with their members on a regular basis, only a survey among 
member organizations will reveal whether this means equal or selective representation of members. 
57  Interview with CSO representative, 19 May 2008, Brussels.  
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be assumed that ETUC and BusinessEurope have to consult more intensely with their 
members due to their operative tasks within the social dialogue, this cannot be con-
firmed by the, however, limited data presented above. 
Table 5: Member Involvement in CSOs in ETP 
 Action 
Aid 
Busi-
nessEur. 
Euro 
Comm. 
ESF ETUC FoEE Soli-
dar 
WIDE 
Member Involvement in Organizational Functions 
Service provision X – – – – – X – 
Policy-making X X X X X X X X 
Implementation X X X X X X X X 
Fundraising X X – – – X X X 
Evaluation X – X X X X X X 
Member Involvement in Decision-Making 
Strategic Dec. X X X X X X X X 
Tactical Dec. – – X – – – X – 
Frequency of 
Member  
Interaction 
 
daily 
 
daily 
 
daily 
 
daily 
 
daily 
 
weekly 
 
daily 
 
daily 
Perceived Trade-
Off between 
Effectiveness and 
Member  
Particip. 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
X 
 
X 
 
– 
6.2.2 CSOs in European Security and Defence Policy  
EPLO and QCEA involve their members in policy-making, project/campaign imple-
mentation, fundraising, and the evaluation of their activities. At PDCI members are ac-
tive in all of the above functions, i.e. also in the provision of services to the general pub-
lic. 
With regard to decision-making, EPLO takes strategic decisions at its General As-
sembly, which is attended by all member organizations. Tactical decisions are taken by 
the thematic working groups also composed of member organization representatives or 
by the advocacy office. At QCEA, strategic as well as tactical decisions are made by the 
advocacy office in Brussels. Only in controversial cases is the “Board” – a subset of the 
member-representing “Council” – consulted. At PDCI, strategic decisions are taken by 
the Executive Committee which is composed of the directors of PDCI’s member or-
ganizations.58 Tactical decisions are in the realm of the advocacy office. 
                                                 
58  The Executive Committee has seven seats and membership rotates on a two-year basis. The US-based founding 
member is always represented. 
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Considering the frequency of interaction between the Brussels office and the mem-
bers, EPLO and PDCI responded to be in contact with their members on a daily basis 
while QCEA replied to be in touch “relatively infrequently”.59  
The interviewee at EPLO acknowledged the existence of a trade-off between organ-
izational effectiveness and member access. The organization has responded to this chal-
lenge with an institutional solution: the Steering Committee, which is composed of 
seven member organization representatives, has been empowered by all members to 
take short-term decisions when needed. In very urgent cases, this can also be done by 
the EPLO President, who is a representative of a member organization.60 The represen-
tative of PDCI confirmed that it is more time-consuming to consult the members, but 
she argued that in terms of organizational effectiveness it is less costly to ensure mem-
ber buy-in from the beginning and avoid lengthy discussions about the appropriateness 
and relevance of certain activities in the aftermath. QCEA’s interviewee did not per-
ceive the trade-off, which is probably due to the subordinate role of members in deci-
sion-making. 
It seems that at EPLO and PDCI, members are the key actors when it comes to pol-
icy- and decision-making. Both organizations involve their members in strategic deci-
sion-making and in the crucial function of policy-making. At EPLO, members are even 
involved in tactical decisions, e.g. regarding the choice of participants for briefings at 
the EU institutions. While EPLO has solved the problem of a trade-off between member 
participation and organizational effectiveness by institutionalizing reduced member 
consultation for urgent cases, PDCI regularly consults all members in spite of time pres-
sure. At QCEA, members play a role with regard to the variety of functions in which 
they are involved but are less important for decision-making. The latter seems to be 
based on the principle of trust. Consequently, the trade-off mentioned above is also not 
perceived by the representative of this organization (see Table 6).  
                                                 
59  Interview with representative of QCEA in Brussels on 6 July 2007 
60  “On questions of policy positions the SC can make decisions (usually upon recommendation of the relevant 
working group that drafted the position) only if and when the time frame makes broad consultation absolutely 
impossible. The president can make decisions that are urgent in the time frame of hours. Both emergency proce-
dures shall ensure the effectiveness of and a professional response from EPLO under exceptional circumstances, 
but not limit the principle rule of general consultation on policy positions.”, EPLO Statutes, chapter II. Download 
at http://eplo.org/documents/FinalInternalStatutes.pdf (last accessed 11 February 2010) 
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Table 6: Member Involvement in CSOs in ESDP 
 EPLO PDCI QCEA 
Member Involvement in Organizational Functions 
Service provision – X – 
Policy-making X X X 
Implementation X X X 
Fundraising X X X 
Evaluation X X X 
Member Involvement in Decision-Making 
Strategic Decision-Making X X – 
Tactical Decision-Making X – – 
Frequency of Member Interaction daily daily infrequently 
Perceived Trade-Off between Effectiveness and 
Member Participation 
X – – 
6.2.3 Summary 
Comparing member participation and consultation practices in member-based CSOs in 
ETP and ESDP, no substantial differences can be detected. All CSOs except for QCEA 
involve their members in strategic decision-making as a general rule. In some CSOs, 
member participation is extended to tactical decisions. All CSOs involve their members 
in various organizational functions and most are in frequent contact with their members. 
The trade-off between member participation and organizational effectiveness is ac-
knowledged by certain CSOs from both policy fields and the way in which they solve it 
does not differ systematically.  
7 CONCLUSION 
The findings of this study regarding membership-based organizations stand to some 
extent in contrast to Sudbery’s and Warleigh’s conclusions. Most importantly, the re-
search suggests that member input is crucial in the vast majority of membership-base 
organizations across the two policy fields.61 With the exception of one organization in 
                                                 
61  The statement by one of the interviewees illustrates this point: „Wir  machen das […] ganz dezidiert so […], dass 
wir für alles, was wir machen, politisch auch die breite Rückendeckung unserer Mitglieder haben. Wenn wir das 
nicht machen, dann nimmt es die Kommission auseinander, dann nimmt es der Rat auseinander, wir verlieren al-
so unsere ganze Überzeugungskraft […]. Auch wenn wir das persönlich für richtig halten, man ist ja auch 
manchmal als Vertreter eines Verbandes versucht zu sagen: Gut, ich weiß das besser als die anderen und möchte 
das jetzt auch gern selbst allen anderen erläutern, wie das richtig ist. Da muss man sich immer wieder zurück-
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ESDP, all CSOs regularly involve their member organizations in strategic, some even in 
tactical decision-making, and they are in very frequent contact with their members. Evi-
dence for a loss of control over the Brussels secretariat by the member organizations is 
scarce.  
The results regarding organizational type, structure and geographical representation 
within Europe confirm the assumption that CSOs in ESDP are less representative of 
European citizens than CSOs in External Trade Policy. While five out of eight CSOs in 
ESDP are expert organizations with a focus on producing knowledge-based advocacy 
and do not have members with decision-making powers, all CSOs interviewed in ETP 
are membership-based. Furthermore, the members of CSOs in ESDP tend to be individ-
ual organizations while CSOs in ETP are “federations of federations” and thus have a 
wider reach. It can thus be said that the positions defended by most of the organizations 
active in ESDP do not have their origin in the European citizenry but are the result of 
research. These groups cannot be seen to have an intermediary function and their par-
ticipation cannot contribute to enhancing the input legitimacy of policy-making. As op-
posed to that, the advocacy positions of CSOs in External Trade Policy are the result of 
consultations with representatives of interests and concerns present within the European 
citizenry. As such, these CSOs could actually take on an intermediary role between 
European citizens and the EU institutions.  
The results suggest that institutional incentives might indeed have an effect on the in-
ternal structure of groups active in the two policy fields. CSOs seem to follow the dif-
ferent institutional expectations and deliver the demanded resource: on the one hand 
they provide knowledge and expertise and on the other they furnish the Commission 
with legitimacy and backing against potential resistance from the member states. The 
latter motivation appears to be particularly relevant in External Trade Policy. 
Two CSO representatives interviewed reported to engage in the acquisition of new 
member organization with the concept of geographical balance in mind, as well as to 
foster the creation of potential member networks in countries where the CSO is not yet 
represented. This might support the assumption that CSOs are aware of the Commis-
sion’s expectations and design their membership structure accordingly. However, the 
fact that one of these two CSOs is active in ESDP reveals that some CSOs aim at featur-
ing a representative membership structure even in the absence of institutional pressure. 
In future research it would thus also be worth to further explore CSOs’ own agency and 
motivation in exhibiting a structure perceived as “democratic”. 
                                                                                                                                               
nehmen und sagen, nein. Der Souverän bei uns sind die Mitglieder und was die wollen, das ist für uns Be-
fehl[…].“ (Interview with CSO representative, 19 May 2008, Brussels)  
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Generally the study substantiates Dembinski’s finding that “many of the NGOs and 
think tanks [in the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy] have chosen to turn themselves 
into experts at the cost of cutting their connections with local organizations” 
(Dembinski 2009:161). The majority of CSOs active in ESDP that are in close contact 
with the EU institutions can “afford” not being member-based. They are consulted by 
both the Council and the Commission and involved in close partnerships without having 
to meet the requirement of a representative structure. With regard to the Commission it 
is interesting to note that it does not seem to apply the same standards in all policy 
fields. While it is making a representative structure a condition for consulting CSOs in 
External Trade Policy, the statements in its official publications (see chapter 3) appear 
to be less relevant for CSOs in Security and Defence Policy. In this field the Commis-
sion also engages with CSOs that do not feature a representative structure. It might be 
that whether CSOs need to meet this requirement or not depends on the function as-
signed to them by the Commission in the respective policy field. At the same time it has 
to be kept in mind that the development of the civil society dialogue in ESDP is lagging 
behind the progress in other policy fields. It is possible that along with an increasing 
institutionalization of the exchange the requirements for CSOs become stricter in this 
policy field as well.62 
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ANNEX 1: OVERVIEW OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS  
List of EU-Level CSOs (in alphabetical order) 
 
 Name as used in text Full Name Policy Field 
1 ActionAid* Action Aid European Trade Policy  
(ETP) 
2 BusinessEurope* BUSINESSEUROPE- 
The Confederation of European 
Business 
ETP 
3 CMI Crisis Management Initiative European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) 
4 EPLO* European Peacebuilding  
Liaison Office 
ESDP 
5 ESF* European Services Forum ETP 
6 ETUC* European Trade Union  
Confederation 
ETP 
7 EuroCommerce* Association of Commerce of 
the European Union 
ETP 
8 FoE Europe* Friends of the Earth Europe ETP 
9 International Alert International Alert ESDP 
10 International Crisis Group International Crisis Group ESDP 
11 PDCI* Partners for Democratic 
Change International 
ESDP 
12 QCEA* Quaker Council for European 
Affairs 
ESDP 
13 Saferworld Saferworld ESDP 
14 SFCG Search for Common Ground ESDP 
15 Solidar* SOLIDAR ETP 
16 WIDE* Women in Development 
Europe 
ETP 
* membership-based organizations 
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ANNEX 2: RATIOS MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS-STAFF NUMBER 
CSO Number of member organizations 
Number of staff in the 
EU-level office 
Mean number of 
member organiza-
tions per employee 
EPLO 27 5 5,4 
NP 56 5 11,2 
Pax Christi >100 n/a - 
PDCI 18 2 9,0 
QCEA 12 4 3,0 
BusinessEurope 40 50 0,8 
EuroCommerce 46 21 2,2 
ESF 54 1 54,0 
ETUC 82 57 1,4 
ActionAid 13 10 1,3 
FoEE 31 27 1,1 
Solidar 36 10 3,6 
WIDE 12 8 1,5 
*as of March 2010 
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